As a researcher, I examine the extra-partisan motivations that encourage political actors to favor electoral reform, in particular the way in which these motivations countervail partisan self-interest. Examples from my work include: geographic/state loyalty (published, 2017), predispositional core values (published, 2021), nationalistic attitudes (working paper), and trust-in-science (in progress). Methodologically, I use both observational and experimental approaches.
Competing Loyalties in Electoral Reform: An Analysis of the Electoral College (Electoral Studies 49: 38–48, 2017)
A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties, when in power and motivated by partisan self-interest, seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such a focus, however, omits a key point: electoral rules also distribute power among geographic units. If, within a party, the partisan and geographic interests of some members conflict, then the canonical relationship between partisanship and rule choice may be conditional. The U.S. electoral college provides an opportunity to test for such intra-party variation, because it advantages some states over others and thus makes salient geographic allegiances. Using an original dataset on one reform proposal, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), I find evidence of competing loyalties. Although NPVIC advances furthest when Democrats control state lawmaking, a state's status as a swing (but not as an overrepresented) state weakens the relationship to the point where even Democrats are unlikely to aid NPVIC.
The Effect of Core Values on Support for Electoral Reform (American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming)
A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties, when in power and motivated by partisan self-interest, seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such self-interest, however, is merely one explanation for why actors may seek to reform electoral rules: a second potential motivation is that an actor may attempt to maximize her core values, which constitute her understanding of the 'common good' (her perception of what is beneficial for society as a whole rather than for a particular, narrow interest). Although the extant literature has demonstrated the motivational power of core values, the effect of these predispositions on electoral rule choice has heretofore not been tested. Using a factorial experimental design that manipulates the partisan- and values-implications of a fictitious reform proposal on absentee voting, I find evidence of a role for core values: not only do they have an important effect net of partisan concerns, but also, attenuate the effect of partisan self-interest in instances in which the two predispositions have been made to countervail. The results, then, provide evidence that partisan self-interest is far from the only game in town: actors hold, and attempt to pursue through electoral reform, objectives other than those that are immediately partisan in nature.
Take Your Foreign Rules and Shove `Em: The Effect of American Exceptionalism on Americans' Support for Electoral Reform (request working paper)
A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties, when in power and motivated by partisan self-interest, seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such self-interest, however, is merely one explanation for why actors may seek to reform rules: a second potential determinant is the attitude of national affect, in the form of `American exceptionalism.' Heretofore, scholars of exceptionalism have focused on the veracity of its claims (i.e., whether the U.S. is or is not comparatively special) and in doing so, have failed to examine exceptionalism as an idea in which individuals believe and, therefore, call upon in decision-making on issues. Using original modules I placed on the 2019 AmericasBarometer U.S. online survey, I find encouraging evidence that exceptionalists (because they view the U.S. as superior to other nations, perhaps having a mission to spread U.S.-style democracy abroad) are less likely than non-exceptionalists to support changes to the U.S. rules, perhaps via importation from abroad. The results demonstrate the importance of attachment to the nation when considering electoral rule choice.